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Last month, in an extraordinary dispute before the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), university lawyers 
laid out their clients’ legal strategies for 
claiming patents that cover the celebrated 
gene-editing technology CRISPR–Cas9. 
Over the next year, the USPTO will receive 
volumes of evidence centred on who first 
invented the technology.
Battles over scientific priority are as old as 
science itself. But the CRISPR–Cas9 patent 
dispute is unusual because it pits two lead-
ing research institutions against one another 
for the control and industrial development 
of a foundational technology: the University 
of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), and 
the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
As scientific institutions increase their 
involvement in the commercialization 
of research1, it is worth considering the 
potential consequences for science if more 
institutions follow the path of UC Berkeley 
and the Broad Institute.
HIGH STAKES
In May 2012, researchers at UC Berkeley, 
led by Jennifer Doudna and her collabora-
tor, Emmanuelle Charpentier (then located 
at the University of Vienna in Austria) filed 
a patent application in the United States for 
CRISPR–Cas9. Seven months later, Feng 
Zhang, a researcher at the Broad Institute, 
filed a competing application that covered 
similar uses of the technology. After Zhang’s 
lawyers requested that his application be 
fast-tracked, the USPTO awarded one pat-
ent to Zhang in April 2014, followed by a 
dozen more in the subsequent 12 months. 
Meanwhile, the application made by Doudna 
and her colleagues languished.
Last April, Doudna’s lawyers requested that 
the USPTO conduct a specialized legal trial, 
known as a patent interference, to determine 
the ownership of the US patents that cover 
the CRISPR–Cas9 system. This January, the 
USPTO formally agreed to carry out the pro-
ceeding.
One conspicuous aspect of this case, in my 
opinion, is the degree to which UC Berkeley 
and the Broad Institute have weighed in on 
what is essentially a dispute over scientific 
priority.
The Broad Institute has produced press 
releases, videos and a slick feature on its 
website that stress the importance of Zhang’s 
contributions to the development of the 
CRISPR–Cas9 technology. And earlier this 
year, the central positioning of Zhang’s work 
in a historical perspective of CRISPR pub-
lished in Cell2 by the president and director 
of the Broad Institute, Eric Lander, prompted 
a storm of angry responses from scientists, 
including Doudna and Charpentier. Mean-
while, at UC Berkeley, a press release that 
discussed the potential of CRISPR described 
Doudna as “the inventor of the CRISPR–Cas9 
technology” (see go.nature.com/cm2gvx).
The financial stakes are high. The 
CRISPR–Cas9 patents are widely viewed to 
be worth hundreds of millions, if not billions, 
of dollars. Both organizations have invested 
directly in spin-off companies that were co-
founded by their researchers — the Broad 
Institute in Editas Medicine, co-founded by 
Zhang, and UC Berkeley in Caribou Bio-
sciences, co-founded by Doudna. A report 
submitted by Editas in January to the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission lists 
the Broad Institute and other Harvard-affil-
iated institutions as owning a major equity 
stake in the company: about 4.2% of its com-
mon shares (see go.nature.com/45c1ey).
DIFFERENT TIMES
Efforts to commercialize the research output 
from universities played out differently in 
the past. Since 1980, US universities have 
been able to patent the inventions of their 
researchers, thanks to the Bayh–Dole Act — 
legislation that determines the ownership of 
intellectual property arising from federally 
funded research. But for the most part, insti-
tutions have kept their 
distance from disputes 
over scientific priority. 
In fact, after factoring 
in the costs of filing 
patents and staffing, 
university technology-
transfer offices have 
generally been money 
losers for their institu-
tions3.
Pursuit of profit 
poisons collaboration
The CRISPR–Cas9 patent battle demonstrates how 
overzealous efforts to commercialize technology can 
damage science, writes Jacob S. Sherkow.
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Even in the case of lucrative patents, 
commercial development has frequently been 
left to venture capitalists and the researchers 
themselves. Take the Cohen–Boyer patents, 
which covered early gene-splicing technology 
and netted Stanford University and the Uni-
versity of California, San Francisco (UCSF), 
both in California, hundreds of millions of 
dollars in licensing fees during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In this instance, Genentech, the 
company in South San Francisco, California, 
that was formed to commercialize the under-
lying technology, sprung from the efforts of 
Herbert Boyer, one of the founding research-
ers, and the financier Robert Swanson. The 
company was neither owned by, nor an exclu-
sive licensee of, Stanford or UCSF.
Research institutions in general are start-
ing to play a bigger part in shepherding their 
researchers’ projects through the commer-
cialization process. A 2014 report from the 
Association of University Technology Manag-
ers in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois — an organi-
zation that supports managers of intellectual 
property at academic research institutions, 
non-profit organizations and government 
agencies worldwide — documented that 
universities are increasing equity investments 
in their researchers’ start-up companies. Of 
the patent licences granted by universities 
in 2014, 10% were tied to such investments1, 
compared with 6.7% in 1999 (ref. 4).
I am concerned that such involvement in 
commercialization has the potential to clash 
with the broader, educational mission of 
research institutions.
Universities worldwide have long strived 
to foster a culture of scientific collaboration. 
Even when universities have obtained broad 
patents, as the Carnegie Institute of Wash-
ington in Washington DC did in the early 
2000s for a gene-expression control technol-
ogy known as RNA interference, licences 
have been cheap and easy for researchers to 
obtain5. In other cases, scientists have sim-
ply ignored patents that cover fundamental 
technologies6.
Academic research institutions now seem 
less shy about taking each other to court for 
patent infringement. In 2011, the Univer-
sity of Utah in Salt Lake City sued the Max 
Planck Society for the Advancement of Sci-
ence in Germany over claims to a patent that 
covered a technology called short interfering 
RNA, which inhibits gene expression (see 
go.nature.com/vyujnp). And over the past 
four years, Stanford University and the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong in Sha Tin have 
engaged in a heated patent litigation over pre-
natal genetic diagnostic blood tests, a market 
that was worth US$530 million in 2013.
In the current era of budget tightening, uni-
versities of all stripes might be tempted to use 
licensing fees as another funding mechanism. 
The University of South Florida in Tampa, 
for example — a public institution that had 
its state funding cut by $48 million in 2012 
— holds a substantial number of patents that 
have not yet been licensed and has a famously 
low ratio of patent-licence revenue to research 
expenditure7. If its financial situation were to 
deteriorate further, the university might be 
compelled to extract licence fees from other 
research institutions for those patents.
PATH TO PROFIT
It would be wrong to suggest that patents, writ 
large, are failing educational research institu-
tions. In the cases of gene splicing, RNA inter-
ference and human embryonic stem cells, 
patents have been major earners for institu-
tions and researchers 
without damaging the 
scientific enterprise5.
But an obvious 
danger of increasing 
the focus on commer-
cialization is that edu-
cational institutions 
will view scientific 
research as a path to 
profit, above all else. It is not hard to imagine 
that patent disputes might lead to university 
administrators pushing certain views on their 
scientists, denigrating collaboration with 
researchers from competing institutions and 
tasking tenure committees with valuing pat-
ents over publications.
Where scientific advances have the poten-
tial to be profitable, universities should 
support researchers to bring that work to 
fruition. This might include helping them to 
secure patents. But it is my view that serious 
commercialization efforts — such as granting 
exclusive licences or receiving equity owner-
ship in researchers’ start-ups — should be left 
to industry.
The CRISPR–Cas9 dispute could have 
played out very differently. Zhang and 
Doudna were both co-founders of Editas. 
And UC Berkeley and the Broad Institute 
could have filed patent applications that listed 
the research teams from both institutions as 
co-inventors. Any resulting patents could 
then have been freely or cheaply licensed to 
other research institutions, or used to fund 
a joint academic organization dedicated to 
studying the technology. The patents could 
also have been widely, but not exclusively, 
licensed to a variety of industry competitors 
— promoting a robust, competitive market 
for commercial CRISPR–Cas9 applications 
and creating a funding stream for further 
academic research.
Biomedical research in educational insti-
tutions has long prided itself on a culture of 
openness and sharing — one that both Zhang 
and Doudna have exercised by donating vari-
ous components of the CRISPR–Cas9 system 
to the open-science consortium Addgene in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The incentives 
that patents create for educational institu-
tions should not be allowed to erode scientific 
collaboration. ■
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“Efforts to 
commercialize 
the research 
output from 
universities 
played out 
differently in 
the past.”
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The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard (left) and the University of California, Berkeley (right).
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